


Hochschule  
München  
University of  
Applied Sciences

Fakultät für Informatik und Mathematik

# KI – Chance und Gefahren für die Informationssicherheit

2024-11-27 / Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Schreck



**ChatGPT-App für macOS speicherte alle Chats ungeschützt und im Klartext**  
Es scheint, als hätte OpenAI die ChatGPT-App für macOS mit heißer Nadel gestrickt. Sie hat alle Chats im Klartext gespeichert, ohne Zugriffsschutz.

Account-Informationen von ChatGPT-Nutzern im Darknet verfügbar  
**Cyberkriminelle verkaufen ChatGPT-Benutzerdaten**

AI/ML, Security Strategy, Plan, Budget, AI benefits/risks  
**OpenAI breach in 2023 raises national security concerns**

**Nutzen und Gefahren von ChatGPT für die Cyber Security**

Ich soll einen Vortrag zu "KI und IT-Sicherheit" halten. Was soll ich den erzählen?

### 1. Einsatzmöglichkeiten der KI in der IT-Sicherheit

- Anomalieerkennung, Bedrohungsanalyse, Verhaltensanalyse und automatisierte Reaktion.

### 2. Risiken der KI

- Missbrauch durch Angreifer, Datenschutzprobleme und fehlerhafte Entscheidungen.

### 3. Herausforderungen

- Erklärbarkeit von KI, Datenqualität und Skalierung von Angriffen durch KI.

### 4. Best Practices

- Mensch-KI-Kombination, sichere Entwicklung, Datenschutz und Adversarial Training.

### 5. Zukunft der KI in der IT-Sicherheit

- Proaktive Bedrohungserkennung, Schwachstellenanalyse und Umgang mit intelligenteren Angriffen.

# Künstliche Intelligenz

## A PROPOSAL FOR THE DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

J. McCarthy, Dartmouth College  
M. L. Minsky, Harvard University  
N. Rochester, I.B.M. Corporation  
C.E. Shannon, Bell Telephone Laboratories

August 31, 1955

... woher kommt der Hype jetzt?

A LARGE  
LANGUAGE  
MODEL  
LANGUAGE  
MODEL

**LLM  $\subset$  AI**

LLM

LLM



**AI is a  
Cloud Service**

# Looking at AI from IT- Security



AI

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

TRUST IN

**Trust in AI**






# AI and Cyberdefense



Is it good ...



WAYS  
COLLABORATION  
INNOVATION

THREATS  
THREATS

... or is it bad?

# New technologies ...



ALRPLANE

TELEVISLON

TELEVISION

INT

INTERNET

INTEIPUTER

INTEPUTER

CEMPUTOR

TELEPULICK

# ... interrupt


# Focus on the opportunities ...






**... and manage the risk.**

# Some examples



CYBER ALERT

# DIE LAGE DER IT-SICHERHEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND 2024



 **Symantec**  
Security Response

## W32.Stuxnet DoS Version 1.4 (February 2011)

Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu,  
and Eric Chien

### Contents

Introduction	1
Executive Summary	2
Attack Scenario	3
Timeline	4
Infection Statistics	5
Stuxnet Architecture	12
Installation	16
Lead Point	20
Command and Control	21
Windows Rootkit Functionality	24
Stuxnet Propagation Methods	25
Modifying PLCs	36
Payload Exports	50
Payload Resources	51
Variants	53
Summary	55
Appendix A	56
Appendix B	58
Appendix C	59
Revision History	68

While the bulk of the analysis is complete, Stuxnet is a complex and complex threat. The authors expect to make revisions shortly after release as new information is uncovered. This paper is the work of numerous individuals in the Symantec Security Response team over the last three months. Without their assistance, this paper would not have been possible.

### Introduction

W32.Stuxnet has gained a lot of attention from the media recently. There is good reason for this. Stuxnet is one of the most complex threats we have analyzed. In this paper, we take a detailed look at Stuxnet and its various components. The focus is on the final goal of Stuxnet, which is to disrupt industrial control systems. Stuxnet is a large, complex piece of malware that consists of many different components and functionalities. This paper covers some of these components in our opinion. While some of the information from those who have analyzed this paper is a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis. Stuxnet is a threat that was primarily written to target a control system or set of similar systems. It is used in gas pipelines and power plants. Its final goal is to disrupt industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying logic controllers (PLCs) to make them work in a manner that is unintended and to hide those changes from the operators. In order to achieve this goal the creators amass a large number of components to increase their chances of success. This paper describes a Windows rootkit, the first ever PLC rootkit.



# Understanding




NSA joins CISA and partners in releasing:

## 2023 TOP ROUTINELY EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES

CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

# Searching

2021-06-17T16:52:39.477	smb_mapping	Cmx9wb1qqW0apA1RCb	10.17.6.93	51402	10.17.6.187	445	\\10.6.15.187\IPC\$	PIPE
2021-06-17T16:52:39.433	smb_mapping	CMj5DxA7dHMv1bXAf	10.17.6.93	51401	10.17.6.119	445	\\10.6.15.119\IPC\$	PIPE
		mPq1YW01	10.17.6.93	51399	10.17.6.5	445	\\10.6.15.5\IPC\$	PIPE
		kjMF1	10.17.6.93	51185	10.17.6.5	49675	0.001219	49675 netlogon NetrLogonGetDomainInfo
		99J4g	10.17.6.93	51184	10.17.6.5	135	0.000854	135 epmapper ept_map
		XW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000681	49667 drsuapi DRSunbind
2021-06-17T16:45:29.817	dce_rpc	C6Gy5r43KzT2PdXW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.001041	49667 drsuapi DRSCrackNames
2021-06-17T16:45:29.816	dce_rpc	C6Gy5r43KzT2PdXW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000259	49667 drsuapi DRSSbind
2021-06-17T16:45:29.815	dce_rpc	Cr7IEujBThZo2SNuj	10.17.6.93	51161	10.17.6.5	135	0.000347	135 epmapper ept_map
2021-06-17T16:45:29.812	dce_rpc	C6Gy5r43KzT2PdXW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000609	49667 drsuapi DRSunbind
2021-06-17T16:45:29.811	dce_rpc	C6Gy5r43KzT2PdXW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.001046	49667 drsuapi DRSCrackNames
2021-06-17T16:45:29.810	dce_rpc	C6Gy5r43KzT2PdXW9d	10.17.6.93	51162	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000327	49667 drsuapi DRSSbind
2021-06-17T16:45:29.801	dce_rpc	Cr7IEujBThZo2SNuj	10.17.6.93	51161	10.17.6.5	135	0.001057	135 epmapper ept_map
2021-06-17T16:45:12.464	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.00023	49667 drsuapi DRSunbind
2021-06-17T16:45:12.462	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000454	49667 drsuapi DRSCrackNames
2021-06-17T16:45:12.461	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000765	49667 drsuapi DRSSbind
2021-06-17T16:45:12.460	dce_rpc	CnJEHXCiu4yjHS526	10.17.6.93	51155	10.17.6.5	135	0.000328	135 epmapper ept_map
2021-06-17T16:45:12.458	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000585	49667 drsuapi DRSunbind
2021-06-17T16:45:12.457	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000621	49667 drsuapi DRSCrackNames
2021-06-17T16:45:12.455	dce_rpc	CJ0zmG40p6vsu7nqI9	10.17.6.93	51156	10.17.6.5	49667	0.000398	49667 drsuapi DRSSbind
2021-06-17T16:45:12.445	dce_rpc	CnJEHXCiu4yjHS526	10.17.6.93	51155	10.17.6.5	135	0.000986	135 epmapper ept_map
2021-06-17T16:45:03.607	smb_files	CAikGh4cSkoE1EoSb8	10.17.6.93	49706	10.17.6.5	445	\\Policybarons-DC\shared	SMB::FILE_OPEN <share_root> 0
2021-06-17T16:44:11.129	smb_mapping	CAikGh4cSkoE1EoSb8	10.17.6.93	49706	10.17.6.5	445	\\Policybarons-DC\shared	DISK
2021-06-17T16:44:11.019	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000773	\pipe\lsass samr SamrCloseHandle
2021-06-17T16:44:11.015	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000511	\pipe\lsass samr SamrCloseHandle
2021-06-17T16:44:11.014	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000658	\pipe\lsass samr SamrCloseHandle
2021-06-17T16:44:11.012	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.001294	\pipe\lsass samr SamrCloseHandle
2021-06-17T16:44:11.011	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000685	\pipe\lsass samr SamrGetAliasMembership
2021-06-17T16:44:11.010	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000808	\pipe\lsass samr SamrGetGroupsForUser
2021-06-17T16:44:11.008	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.001358	\pipe\lsass samr SamrQuerySecurityObject
2021-06-17T16:44:11.006	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.001578	\pipe\lsass samr SamrQueryInformationUser
2021-06-17T16:44:11.004	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000784	\pipe\lsass samr SamrOpenUser
2021-06-17T16:44:11.002	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.001109	\pipe\lsass samr SamrLookupNamesInDomain
2021-06-17T16:44:11.001	dce_rpc	CdW7C625y0Ys2yz0Q7	10.17.6.93	49703	10.17.6.5	445	0.000733	\pipe\lsass samr SamrOpenDomain



# Takeaways

- KI sind Algorithmen, die in groß angelegten Infrastrukturen eingesetzt werden.
- Aus sicherheitstechnischer Sicht handelt es sich um einen Datenprozessor.
- Nutzen Sie einfach die bereits vorhandenen risikobasierten Ansätze.
- KI ist eine Technologie, die sowohl von **guten** als auch von **schlechten Akteuren** genutzt werden kann.
  
- Ein Thema ist jedoch wichtig: **Vertrauen in KI**

## Kontakt

**Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Schreck**

Hochschule München University of Applied Sciences

Email: [thomas.schreck@hm.edu](mailto:thomas.schreck@hm.edu)

Website: <https://seclab.cs.hm.edu>

**Open Source Projekte der HM IT:**

<https://github.com/hm-edu>

